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Changing the rules of the game is often unsettling, but it can be fruitful. 
Consider for instance the tale of Alexander the Great and the Gordian knot. 
According to Greek legend, the knot itself was an intricate tangle tied by 
Gordius, king of Phrygia. An oracle forecast that whosoever could undo the 
Gordian knot would rule all of Asia. Alexander wanted that prophecy working 
for him. Not one to hover over niceties, he drew his sword and cut it through, 
thus “untying” the knot. 
Alexander’s move both impresses and annoys. It impresses with its decisiveness 
of action and its creativity. It annoys because Alexander changed the tacit rules. 
To cut the knot through is not what one would imagine undoing the knot should 
amount to. It’s unfair! 
All this connects in a couple of ways to Margaret Boden’s 1991 book The 
Creative Mind. First of all, in her exploration of creative thought, Boden 
addresses the key question: What really makes the difference between genuinely 
creative thought and not-so-creative, albeit effective, thought? At the heart of her 
answer lies the idea of changing the rules. Often, highly productive thinking 
occurs within the boundaries of established tacit or explicit rule systems. The 
results can be valuable in many ways. However, Boden urges, the term creativity 
applies in its richest sense when the process of thought involves changing the 
rules, not just working within them. With the changed rules, new and surprising 
ideas can emerge-sometimes even easily-that never would have proved 
accessible from within the framework of the old rules. 
For a second connection to the tale of Alexander, Boden herself is not reluctant 
to change the tacit rules of the game in examining creativity itself. Usually, 
human creative thought is probed from the perspective of human psychology, 
sometimes with a psychoanalytic spin (e.g. [l]), sometimes through the eye of a 
generalist (e.g. [6]), and sometimes even from the platform of cognitive psy- 
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chology (e.g. 1121). However. Boden enters the discourse from a surprising 
direction: 
The central theme of the book is that [creative thinking] can be better 
understood with the help of ideas from artificial intelligence. (p. 3) 
The mystery of creativity drives Boden to this recourse. Indeed creativity 
produces novelty. but what kind of novelty. she wonders? Chaos and madness 
produce novelty too. Not all novelties count as creative. Moreover, those 
novelties that society ultimately recognizes as creative are not always so honored 
at first (p. 3). With these and other related puzzles in mind. Boden sums up the 
challenge as follows: 
One aim of this book is to arrive at a definition of creativity which tames the 
paradox. Once we have tamed the paradox and eliminated the mystery, 
creativity can sensibly be regarded as a mental capacity to be understood in 
psychological terms, as other mental capacities are. (p. 3) 
This leads to my second aim: to outline the sorts of thought-processes and 
mental structures in which our creativity is grounded, so suggesting a solution 
to the puzzle of how creativity happens. (p. 4) 
To these ends, Boden proposes that recent work on artificial intelligence provides 
the concepts and theories needed for the job. In particular, ideas from artificial 
intelligence allow a sharper formulation of the nature and function of generative 
rule systems. 
1. Four questions about creative systems 
Since changing the rules is in the air, perhaps we can change the rules of 
reviews. It’s reasonable to review Boden’s book from the perspective of her own 
agenda-illuminating human creativity. with artificial intelligence as her tool. But 
it’s also possible to review Boden’s book from the perspective of another closely 
related agenda-illuminating “creative systems”. Moreover, we can broaden the 
discourse, not just critiquing Boden’s framework but exploring how the notion of 
creative systems can help us to understand creativity in its many forms. Although 
all this is unfair, Boden fares quite well in any case, as we shall see. 
As here defined, creative systems are any systems that over time yield adaptive 
novelty, that is, unexpected outcomes that are nonetheless functional in context. 
For some examples of adaptive novelty, velcro was a novel but highly adaptive 
way of fastening things. Impressionism was a novel style of painting that, although 
not well-adapted to the tradition of French academic painting, proved strikingly 
well-adapted to inspiring a new audience and new ways of looking at art. Feathers 
were an adaptive novelty of evolution. “discovered” only once as far as the fossil 
record shows, leading to the class Aves-the birds [20]. It’s recognized that both 
adaptiveness and novelty must be judged relative to context. Recalling Boden’s 
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criterion for the fundamentally creative, adaptive novelty may or may not reflect a 
shift in generative rules. Different cases will be discussed as we proceed. 
The human mind in some endeavors and certain artificial intelligences can both 
be viewed as creative systems. Another system notable for its yield of adaptive 
novelty is biological evolution. Yet another, less commonly recognized, is human 
society-not the deliberate work of individuals or groups creating and crafting 
products but the slow emergence of distinct languages, customs, and mores 
through decades and centuries of relatively mindless social interactions. The 
emergence of adaptive novelty from unreflective biological and social processes is 
a favorite topic of the budding new science of “complexity” [19]. 
Although Boden does not address creative systems as such, her comparison of 
human and machine creativity invites a creative systems perspective: She directly 
and extensively treats two of the systems in question. Accordingly, in this review I 
will ask not just what Boden contributes to our understanding of human creative 
thinking but what she contributes to our understanding of creative systems in 
general. 
To aid in the process, let me introduce a simple framework for discussing 
creative systems. First of all, we view a creative system as searching through the 
states of a space of possibilities to attain end states that we will call “resolutions”. 
These resolutions are creative (although not always ‘in Boden’s rule-changing 
sense) when they are novel and adaptive in context. The search process may be 
serial or parallel or mixed, and relatively strategic and metacognitive in character 
or quite mindless and haphazard. For instance, human thinking often proceeds in 
a highly strategic serial way [ll]. In contrast, in the classic conception, biological 
evolution proceeds by a massively parallel, very long term, random generate-and- 
test process [4]. 
The notion of search through a space of possibilities has a good pedigree as a 
framework within which to discuss creativity. The idea traces back to Newell and 
Simon’s [ll] seminal computer simulations of human problem solving. Perkins 
[14,15] discusses human creativity from the perspective of search through a space 
of possibilities. Boden adopts a similar notion-search through a conceptual 
space-as a bridging concept with which to discuss both human and machine 
creativity. 
Consider for a moment what makes a resolution easy or hard to find in a space 
of possibilities. In especially easy cases, there is an evaluation function (for 
instance, viability for biological organisms, closeness to structural features of a 
solution for mathematics problems) that happens to yield a simple gradient in the 
search space. The search mechanism can “hill climb” this gradient to achieve a 
solution. However, deeply creative challenges, biological, mathematical, or 
otherwise, rarely consist of resolutions in search spaces of such a friendly 
topography. Considering what a difficult rather than a friendly topography might 
be like, we can identify at least the following four problems, each a challenge 
inherent in the topography of the search space. 
The rarity problem. In a search space that poses a creative challenge, resolutions 
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commonly are very rare among the possibilities in question. This acknowledges 
the characteristic problem of combinatorial explosion in search processes, with 
the added twist that genuinely innovative solutions are likely to be especially rare. 
To relate this to Alexander and the Gordian knot, the sequences of moves that 
would untie the knot are very rare in the space of possible sequences of rope 
manipulations. 
The isolation problem. Characteristically, creative solutions lie in another part of 
the possibility space, not accessible to the search process except by changing the 
rules in some sense. Thus Alexander had to change his conception of what 
counted as undoing the knot to get to his solution. 
The oasis problem. Search often lingers in areas close to success but not quite 
there. In the idiom of heuristic search. this is the problem of local maxima or 
minima. For instance, Alexander might easily have wasted much time poking at a 
loose loop of the Gordian knot that looked like a likely starting place but in fact 
led nowhere. 
The plateau problem. In large regions of a search space, there may be no 
indication of promising directions of search. Again in the idiom of heuristic 
search, there may be no appreciable gradient of the evaluation function. In 
Alexander’s case, he might try a variety of approaches to untying the knot 
without one showing much more promise than another. 
How then do human beings, artificial intelligences, and perhaps other systems, 
deal with these four problems? Moreover, what do the four problems have to do 
with creativity specifically, in contrast with search processes in general? And 
finally, what can Boden’s analysis tell us about such matters? To pursue these 
questions is to move toward understanding what makes creative systems creative. 
2. The rarity problem 
Boden explicitly acknowledges the challenge of search through a daunting 
number of possibilities, whether the search is conducted by humans or machines. 
She refers to the large search space characteristic of chess play (p. 78). Boden’s 
basic answer to how to keep the search of a large space manageable is classic AI: 
Heuristics are used-by people and programs alike-to prune the search- 
tree. That is, they save the problem-solver from visiting every choice-point 
on the tree, by selectively ignoring parts of it. (p. 78) 
Moreover, Boden recognizes that this contrasts with another way of solving the 
rarity problem. As classically conceived (we will touch on another view later), 
biological evolution takes a brute-force approach: 
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The creative strategy of evolution, you may say, is Random-Generute-and- 
Test: new biological structures are generated by random mutations, and then 
tested by natural selection. . . . However, creativity in human minds cannot 
be due only to random changes in pre-existing structures. Biological evolu- 
tion has had many millions of years in which to generate a wide variety of 
novelties, and in which to weed out the useless ones. (p. 209) 
After briefly acknowledging the role of heuristics in reducing search, Boden 
focuses much more on heuristics that open up parts of the search space that 
otherwise might be neglected, that is, that address the isolation problem (see the 
next section). This is natural, because pruning the search tree with heuristics is a 
stock-in-trade of human and machine problem solving with no pretensions to 
creativity. It is business as usual, or, to make an analogy with Thomas Kuhn’s [7] 
picture of the development of science, “normal science”. 
3. The importance of massive search 
However, it may be that the rarity problem deserves more consideration in 
understanding the diversity of creative systems. As already noted, Boden points 
up the role of massive search in biological evolution. It is reasonable to posit a 
similar role for massive search in the evolution of languages and customs. Indeed, 
Richard Dawkins [4] extrapolates from his analysis of biological evolution to offer 
just such a conception. He writes of “memes’‘-ideas that die off or propagate 
and mutate in the environment of a society of human beings. 
In the case of human individuals or small groups, massive search may have 
more importance than it would seem to at first. In at least some cases, human 
inventors confront the rarity problem head on by adopting techniques for actually 
considering large numbers of options. For instance, Edison conducted what he 
called “drag hunts” with the help of his staff, testing wide ranges of materials for 
their functionality as light bulb filaments or for other purposes [3]. For a more 
recent example, the search for new antibiotics that yielded Ivermectin involved 
automated techniques for scanning many thousands of samples [2]. Rosinski [ 181, 
in developing the zeolite catalyst for the production of gasoline from petroleum, 
conducted large numbers of experiments manipulating dozens of variables to 
optimize the process. In other words, sometimes human inventors recognize that 
targets are sparsely distributed in the search space in question, and, unable to find 
heuristics to prune the space, they devise acceptably efficient ways to search large 
parts of the space. 
Boden might object that massive searches that eventually discover something 
are not fundamentally creative in the sense of yielding resolutions that reflect a 
different generative rule set; they simply persist long enough to discover 
resolutions within the standing rule system. These resolutions may be novel and 
adaptive, and therefore creative in some sense, but not radically novel in the 
sense of a different set of generative rules. 
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1 would agree with this qualification about massive search for the most part. 
However, I argue below that massive search sometimes yields outcomes that 
reflect a different rule set. Moreover, Boden recognizes that a theory of creativity 
needs to acknowledge and account for the modestly creative as well as the 
fundamentally creative. For instance, she discusses many examples of machine 
invention, lauding their creative accomplishments with the caveat that they are 
not designed to allow them to change their own rules. She contrasts these with 
machine intelligences like Douglas Lenat’s [lo] EURISKO which is creative in 
quite a strong sense: It can change its own heuristic rules on the basis of 
experience. 
4. The isolation problem 
The isolation problem. recall. meant that resolutions are largely “walled off” in 
one way or another from the region likely to be searched by the search 
mechanism in operation. Does Boden recognize and address the isolation 
problem, granted that this is not her terminology? 
Emphatically yes. Indeed, Boden’s treatment of the isolation problem is one of 
the major conceptual contributions of her book. As noted earlier, Boden takes 
pains to differentiate what she considers truly creative outcomes from mere useful 
novelty. In particular, Boden argues that a truly creative outcome reflects a 
change in the generative rule system behind the outcome. Any product of 
mind-a sonnet. a symphony, a scientific theory-reflects patterns of constraints. 
We recognize something as truly creative, she urges, when it manifests novelty in 
its tacit rules, not just the novelty of one more instance of a familiar rule set. Thus 
impressionist art and quantum mechanics both broke in fundamental ways with 
prior patterns of constraints. As Boden puts it: 
A merely novel idea is one which can be described and/or produced by the 
same set of generative rules as are other, familiar ideas. A genuinely original, 
or creative, idea is one which cannot. (p. 40) 
How does this relate to what I have called the isolation problem? Basically, 
novel and adaptive resolutions in the overall possibility space are often isolated 
from the search process underway because the search process is operating with 
constraints and heuristics that do not give it access at all to those resolutions, or 
only through an unlikely sequence of moves-to continue the topographical 
metaphor, rather like finding a pass in a mountain range that carries one into a 
new and more fertile valley. 
To sharpen the point about rule change, Boden discusses the work of a classic 
AI program in discovering an elegant proof that the base angles of an isosceles 
triangle are equal (pp. 104-110). The program did so with no constructions or 
other complications by proving that the triangle was “self-isomorphic”-triangle 
ABC is isomorphic to triangle ACB, where A is the apex. 
Boden asks: Does this count as creative? Not really, she replies, because the 
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design of the program involves no particular barriers to discovering self-iso- 
morphisms-the representational system the program uses makes them no 
different than any other isomorphisms-and also treats introducing constructions 
as a last resort. In contrast, the human practice of geometry, guided by visual 
intuition, does not find self-isomorphism a very accessible notion and readily turns 
to constructions, which lead away from the self-isomorphism solution. The AI 
program did not have to extend or abandon its initial conceptual space: It lucked 
out. It already had the “right” conceptual space for the discovery it made. Boden 
notes that full credit does go to Pappus of Alexandria, who six centuries after 
Euclid came up with the proof by self-isomorphism that Euclid missed. He had to 
break through the barriers inherent in the human system. 
If rules get changed, how do these changes in the rules come about? Boden 
offers a diversity of answers. Here is a sample: 
l Considering the negative of objects operated upon can sometimes make 
accessible an entire new region of possibilities in a search space (p. 51). 
0 Relatedly, so can “reversing” heuristics, so that they operate in ways that 
contrast with their prior pattern (p. 80). 
0 The heuristic of dropping a heuristic can open up new regions of conceptual 
space to search (p. SO). 
l Analogical representations can provide the basis for exporting ideas and 
ways of thinking from one realm to into another, thereby opening up new 
sets of possibilities (p. 100). 
0 Focussing on the function of something can help to break away from the 
constraints of conventional practice, a matter of asking not how is this 
usually done but what is this supposed to do (p. 100). 
In summary, Boden’s analysis seems to give a good account of how the human 
mind and machine intelligences ometimes change their own rules to deal with the 
isolation problem. She thus informs our understanding both of human creativity 
and of creative systems in general. 
5. Fundamentally creative resolutions without fundamental creativity 
Still, from the standpoint of creative systems, there is a phenomenon to ponder. 
It seems that sometimes fundamentally creative results in the rule-change sense 
can stem from systems that are not fundamentally creative, that lack the power to 
change their operating rules. 
Evolution arguably has this character. Bats, for example, might be considered a 
creative product of evolution in Boden’s sense. When we ponder bats, we feel that 
they are not just different from other mammals, but different in kind. The 
numerous species of bats represent variations on a morphological rule system for 
batness that gives them coherence as a category of creatures. 
Yet the creative system that produced bats presumably would not count as 
creative in Boden’s sense. According to the traditional Darwinian analysis, bats 
evolved by an incremental process of natural selection. The rules of this process 
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do not change at all, even when evolution “discovers” what might be called a new 
genre of creatures. 
Does this argument really demonstrate creative resolutions without fundamen- 
tal creativity? Some objections need to be considered. 
First of all, it might be objected that the creative systems in question do change 
their rules. The genome of a bat is a rule system encoded in DNA that produces 
bats. Evolution changes this rule system. So. by this argument, bats are the 
product of a creative system that changes its rules. 
However, this objection suffers from an equivocation. It mixes up the rules that 
govern the operation of the system with the rules on which the system operates. 
In particular, evolution operates on the rules encoded in DNA. But presumably 
its rules do not change. Bats were always available within the possibility states 
accessible to natural selection, although of course it took natural selection a while 
to get to them. 
A second objection to evolution producing fundamentally creative resolutions 
without fundamental creativity might run as follows. Commonly, organisms 
evolve through a process of geographical isolation followed by rapid evolution in 
the isolated setting. One might say that the isolated setting introduces a new rule 
system: The rules of survival have changed. 
However, does this really constitute a change in the generative rule system of 
evolution? From a search perspective, the generating function remains mutation 
and gene shuffling during reproduction. The evolution function remains a matter 
of survival and reproduction. To be sure, what kinds of adaptations will yield 
survival and reproduction differ in the isolated setting, driving the organism 
toward distinctive adaptations-the ancestors of bats toward flying, for instance. 
But the criteria for survival and reproduction do not sit within the search 
mechanism but rather within the organism’s fit with the environment. As 
evolutionists often point out, the mechanism of evolution as classically conceived 
does not incorporate a model of the world. In Dawkins’ [5] title phrase, evolution 
is a “blind watch-maker”. 
A third and more telling objection is this: Evolution may not be quite the blind 
process that the theory of natural selection as usually conceived suggests. As 
Boden herself notes, evolution may involve not blind-generate-und-test but 
plausible-generate-and-test (p. 210). Furthermore, evolution may conceivably 
involve considerable heuristic intelligence and those heuristic rules may them- 
selves evolve, certainly a case of a system changing its own search rules [15,20]. 
If just how evolution works is debatable, it still seems possible to argue that 
creative outcomes in the rule-change sense can emerge from systems which do not 
change their operating rules. Boden herself notes that genetic algorithms, which 
mimic some features of natural selection, can yield outcomes that manifest new 
rule systems: 
[Genetic algorithms] enable a system to make changes that are both plausible 
and unexpected, for they produce novel recombinations of the most useful 
parts of existing rules. (p. 213) 
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Boden offers examples of genetic algorithms that do just that. We can add these 
to evolution as cases where an “uncreative” system in the changing-its-own-rules 
sense-this time a machine system-yields fundamentally creative results. 
Further evidence comes from much of the recent research on “artificial life”, 
which commonly employs genetic algorithms and related techniques to yield 
fundamentally surprising results [8,9]. For instance, Thomas Ray’s [17] well- 
known TIERRA program creates an environment in the RAM of a computer 
where programs of a certain kind propagate and mutate according to a fixed set of 
rules. The blind evolutionary process of TIERRA “discovers” such fundamentally 
different lifestyles as parasitism, where a kind of program emerges that uses other 
programs’ replicative sequence of instructions to breed itself rather than including 
in its code its own replicative sequence of instructions. Interestingly, viruses use 
the reproductive apparatus of the cells they invade in the same way. 
Finally, it’s worth observing that the notion of fundamentally creative results 
without fundamental creativity seems consistent with Boden’s basic theory. In 
defining her concept of the creative, Boden writes that a merely novel idea is 
“described and/or produced” by the same set of generative rules as other familiar 
ideas (p. 40). She notes that rule sets can either characterize the outcome or the 
generative process (p, 39). In other words, the novel outcome need not actually 
have been generated by a new rule set. It suffices if the new idea can be described 
as reflecting a new rule set. 
In summary, Boden’s conception allows for but perhaps underplays the 
phenomenon of fundamentally creative outcomes from uncreative systems. 
Relatively blind mechanisms with unchanging rule systems may account for many 
of the creative outcomes we encounter, including biological organisms, the 
emergence of life itself and, on a more human scale, the emergence of new 
languages, cultures, customs, and fashions [4,5]. 
6. The oasis problem 
Recall that the oasis problem refers to the risk of a search process getting 
trapped in locales of high promise. The character of the search process is such 
that it does not move away from high-promise states in quest of other loci of high 
promise that may pay off better. In other words, this is the classic problem of 
local maxima or minima in heuristic search. 
As far as I can tell, Boden offers no general extended discussion of the oasis 
problem. However, at least one of her examples honors it implicitly. On page 79, 
by way of illustrating heuristics, she challenges the reader with the classic 
missionaries and cannibals problem. She even offers a clue: Apply the heuristic 
known by the French phrase reculer pour mieux sauter. This recommends 
retreating in order to better advance. The advice is apt: A solution to this 
problem at one point requires moves that get further from the desired solution 
temporarily. In other words, the missionaries and cannibals puzzle offers an 
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illustrative case of the oasis problem and an opportunity for the astute and 
imaginative problem solver to leave the oasis and solve the problem. 
Why is it that we do not find a more extended treatment of the oasis problem? 
One reason might be that, viewed from the perspective of Boden’s conception of 
rule change, the isolation problem and the oasis problem look like pretty much 
the same thing: rule-imposed barriers that need to be broken. Perhaps the oasis 
problem does not deserve special attention. 
But this will not do. The isolation and oasis problems differ in a fundamental 
way. In the idiom of search spaces, the isolation problem concerns whole regions 
cut off from the search process in some categorical or near-categorical way. This 
is mostly what Boden has in mind when she writes of the role of rule changes in 
fundamental creativity. To mention yet another example, Boden emphasizes how 
Kekule’s discovery of the benezene ring constituted not just the introduction of a 
particular structure for a particular chemical puzzle but added a whole class of 
structures to the conceptual space of chemical structures, a class that could be 
searched to solve other chemical puzzles as well. 
In contrast, the oasis problem does not call for extending the space of 
possibilities at hand at all. It rather requires avoiding getting stuck in one small 
region of the space. Yet the oasis problem, no less than the isolation problem, can 
keep a search process from finding novel solutions that otherwise would be quite 
accessible. 
7. The plateau problem 
The plateau problem, recall. refers to situations where the search space is 
relatively “flat”. That is. if we imagine an evaluation function gauging the 
promise and payoffs of each state in the search space, this evaluation function 
does not vary much over large regions of the space. Or-which functionally 
amounts to the same thing-the evaluation function varies erratically in a “noisy” 
way but without a consistent gradient. Such a topography in the search spaces 
poses a problem for search processes that explore incrementally, persisting in 
directions that show more promise. On a plateau, such search processes cannot 
find directions of higher promise. 
So far as I can tell, Boden does not discuss what I call the plateau problem, 
although it would not surprise me if the problem made an appearance in one or 
two of the many rich examples Boden examines. Perhaps it could be held that 
Boden’s basic notion of “changing the rules” encompasses the plateau problem. 
In particular, shifts in the rules governing search can easily speak to the plateau 
problem. For example, if we imagine a serial incremental search, one simple 
heuristic is to increase the increment under conditions of minimal gradient: take 
giant steps, so to speak. This will lead the search process off the plateau sooner, 
although as likely to a valley as a hill. Another is to adopt sampling methods that 
avoid repetition and “cover” large regions at a grain as coarse as possible without 
missing local gradients. Such tactics, of course, incorporate tacit assumptions 
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about the rate of change of gradient, but often such assumptions may be 
warranted. 
Accordingly, one might say that Boden’s notion of changing the rules addresses 
the plateau problem as well as the oasis and isolation problems. However, as in 
the case of the oasis problem, changes in the heuristics governing search do not 
seem to be paradigmatic of the kinds of changes Boden has in mind. Such changes 
do not extend the space to be searched, opening up new realms, but let the space 
stand, adjusting patterns of search to explore the space more efficiently. Note that 
the plateau problem can easily prevent a search process from discovering novel 
solutions it would otherwise easily generate. 
8. Is creativity just good problem solving? 
To sum up, Margaret Boden’s The Creative Mind offers basic insights about 
how creativity happens by comparing human creativity with putatively creative 
computer programs. Her key concept of generative rule systems provides a broad 
criterion for fundamentally creative achievements, useful in gauging the products 
both of human and machine endeavor. Boden identifies a number of heuristics 
and other characteristics that help a search process-human or machine-to 
arrive at solutions that in some sense “break the rules” and thus appear 
fundamentally creative. 
While honoring Boden’s achievements, one can add that evolution and other 
creative systems besides machine intelligences invite a fully developed comparison 
with the human case. Moreover, an analysis of creativity in terms of search might 
do well to look carefully at the rarity, plateau, and oasis problems discussed 
above, as well as at the isolation problem highlighted in Boden’s analysis. All 
seem implicated in creativity. 
With that said, both Boden’s framework and the further comments offered here 
must face a fundamental skepticism: Does the analysis cut the Gordian knot of 
creativity, getting at what is special about it? 
A rough case for the prosecution is not hard to make. It would be easy to say 
that Boden’s analysis and mine treat creativity simply as heuristic search, a way of 
viewing problem solving. Creativity looks to be just a matter of solving problems 
that are too hard for other people or machines. Creativity is reduced to the 
general problem solving paradigm. 
While this case for the prosecution seems plausible on the surface, there is a 
good case for the defence. Boden sees creativity as distinctive in at least two 
broad ways. First of all, there is a matter of outcome: Creative search yields 
fundamental novelty in her sense. Second of all, there is a matter of process: To 
generate fundamental novelty, creative search involves heuristics that change the 
rules or pass over the rules. All this points to a special kind of problem solving. 
The rarity, isolation, oasis, and plateau problems define further what creative 
search requires. To see this, imagine a search process S that searches P, a space of 
possibilities. Suppose that S regularly produces adaptive novelties. How does S 
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succeed in surprising us so often ? S must be finding novel solutions that 
competing search processes miss. Now any competent rival search process R 
would incorporate persistence, computational power, and basic hill-climbing 
mechanisms. If P, the space of possibilities, were a simply structured space that 
did not present rarity, isolation, oasis, or plateau problems, R would easily find 
all solutions. The very fact that S succeeds so much better than R implies that P is 
a complexly structured space presenting some of the four problems, and that S 
deals with them much better than R. In other words, handling some of the four 
problems well is critical to S’s creativity as a search process. 
Is this just saying that creative search processes solve problems too hard for 
other processes? No, because there are different ways of being hard. A problem 
can be hard because it requires head-cracking computations, meticulous attention 
to detail, or heroic persistence. However, Boden’s conception, as well as the 
rarity, oasis, and plateau problems, highlight a certain way of being hard. 
Problems are hard creatively when the circumstances mask novel solutions. Search 
processes are creative when they make the moves they need to make to unmask 
those solutions. 
So has all this cut the Gordian knot and revealed the full nature of creativity? 
Certainly that would be overbold. The Gordian knot of creativity seems endlessly 
ramified, not so much a single knot however intricate as a nest of knots within 
knots, fractally complex, a Mandelbrot set of the mind. Still, Boden’s concept of 
generative rule systems and changes therein undoes the central set of paradoxes 
announced on her page 3 and illuminates how creativity happens, with the bonus 
of knowledgeable, literate, and engaging writing. Her AI perspective on creativity 
cannot easily be dismissed as reducing creativity to good problem solving, nor can 
the further reflections here on the rarity, isolation, oasis, and plateau problems. If 
the Gordian knot of creativity won’t come wholly undone, at least it’s let down its 
hair a bit. 
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